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Abstract
One implication of Bell’s theorem is that there cannot in general be hidden variable
models for quantum mechanics that both are noncontextual and retain the structure
of a classical probability space. Thus, some hidden variable programs aim to retain
noncontextuality at the cost of using a generalization of the Kolmogorov probability
axioms. We generalize a theorem of Feintzeig (2015) to show that such programs are
committed to the existence of a finite null cover for some quantum mechanical experi-
ments, i.e., a finite collection of probability zero events whose disjunction exhausts the
space of experimental possibilities.
1 Introduction
Bell’s theorem (Bell, 1964) and its generalizations (e.g., by Clauser et al. (1969); Bell (1971);
Clauser and Horne (1974); Aspect (1983); and Mermin (1986)) restrict which kinds of hid-
den variable theories for quantum mechanics are consistent with empirical observation and
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other theoretical commitments. In particular, a version due to Fine (1982b,c) and later
presented geometrically by Pitowsky (1989) shows that the statistics of a quantum mechan-
ical experiment satisfy all Bell-type inequalities if and only if it may be given a classical
(Kolmogorovian) probability space hidden variable model satisfying very weak constraints.
The empirical violation of these inequalities in experiments (Aspect et al., 1982a,b; Giustina
et al., 2013, 2015), as predicted by quantum mechanics, rules against such classical proba-
bility models. Thus, some researchers still interested in pursuing hidden variable models, or
more generally in giving realist probabilistic interpretations of quantum theory, have resorted
to generalizations of classical probability theory.
They have not, however, always considered the consistency of such alternative theories
with another no-go result, the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem (Kochen and Specker, 1967),
which rules out any hidden variable theory that assigns noncontextual, definite values to all
physical quantities and preserves standard functional (or logical) relationships between them.
(See also Bell (1966).) Because many of these theories are committed to noncontextuality
and definite values, the KS theorem would seem to bear upon them. Generalizing a theorem
of Feintzeig (2015), we show in §2 that the KS theorem in fact implies that a wide variety
of noncontextual hidden variable theories are committed to the existence of a finite null
cover for some quantum mechanical experiments. That is, they are committed, for some
choices of possible observables, to a finite collection of measurable events that cover the
hidden variable sample space but are each assigned measure zero. In simple terms, they are
committed to a finite collection of probability zero events whose disjunction exhausts the
space of possibilities.
We apply this result in §3 to a variety of models, theories, and approaches that employ
generalizations of classical probability spaces:
• Generalized probability spaces (§3.1), which relax the algebra of classical probability
theory to an additive class.1
• Nonmonotonic/negative/extended probability spaces (§3.2), including p-adic versions,
which allow the probability measure to take on negative values, and the more general
complex probability spaces, which allow it to be valued in C. The former include
“single real history” versions of the decoherent histories formalism.
• Upper (lower) probability spaces (§3.3), which relax the additivity of the probability
measure on disjoint sets to sub- (resp. super-)additivity.
• Quantum measure theory (§3.4), which relaxes additivity of the probability measure
on pairs of disjoint sets to additivity of triplets.
Yet other approaches may also fall under its scope.
In our discussion in §4, we show how any such theory must commit its users to a sort of
incoherent belief if it is to recover the predictions of quantum mechanics for KS experiments.
1Kolmogorovian probability theory typically assumes a stronger σ-algebra, which requires the probability
measure to be σ-additive, that is, additive over countable collections of (disjoint) sets, rather than just finite
ones. (Cf. definition 3.) Our results, however, nowhere appeal to this stronger condition, so we have dropped
it everywhere for clarity of expression.
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Thus it is not even clear that an agent with complete knowledge of the hidden states would
even be able to use that knowledge as a guide to rational action. These features cast doubt on
the idea that these generalizations capture any notion of coherent probability at all, despite
these spaces’ formal similarities with classical probability spaces. Consequently, it is unclear
whether they have any advantages outweighing their disadvantages over contextual theories
in their ability to explain puzzling features of quantum theory.
2 The Central Theorem
To motivate our theorem, we begin with a certain perspective on Bell’s theorem, its general-
izations, and hidden variable theories. Our perspective focuses on structured representations
of possible experimental outcomes and their underlying probability theory.
Definition 1. A simple quantum mechanical experiment is a triple (H, ψ,On), where H is
a Hilbert space, ψ ∈ H is a unit vector, and On = {P1, . . . , Pn} is a set of n projection
operators on H.
The collection of operators On of a simple quantum mechanical experiment represents the
possible projective measurements that can be made on ψ. Each operator Pi corresponds to a
“yes-no” measurement—that is, one with only two possible outcomes—with the probability
of a “yes” outcome given by 〈ψ|Pi|ψ〉, as usual. Such experiments are the subject of Bell-
type theorems; to state the one of most relevance here, we must introduce the terminology
of classical probability theory.2
Definition 2. An algebra Σ for a nonempty set X is a nonempty subset of the power set
P(X) such that
1. for all A ∈ Σ, X\A ∈ Σ, and
2. for all A,B ∈ Σ, A ∪B ∈ Σ.
Note that if Σ is an algebra for X, then {∅, X} ⊆ Σ.
Definition 3. A classical probability space is a triple (X,Σ, µ), where Σ is an algebra for
the nonempty set X and µ : Σ→ [0, 1] is such that
1. µ(X) = 1, and
2. for all disjoint A,B ∈ Σ, µ(A ∪B) = µ(A) + µ(B).
The function µ is typically called the space’s probability measure, and the elements of
Σ its measurable sets. Note as well that the second condition, additivity on disjoint pairs,
immediately implies additivity on finite collections of mutually disjoint sets.
2See Malament (2012) and Feintzeig (2015, §2.2) for more on the relationship of this presentation with
more standard presentations of Bell’s theorem.
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Definition 4. A (restricted) classical probability space representation3 for a simple quantum
mechanical experiment (H, ψ,On) is a classical probability space (X,Σ, µ) and a map E :
On → Σ satisfying both of the following conditions:
1. for each Pi ∈ On, µ(E(Pi)) = 〈ψ|Pi|ψ〉, and
2. for each Pi, Pj ∈ On, if [Pi, Pj] = 0, then µ(E(Pi) ∩ E(Pj)) = 〈ψ|PiPj|ψ〉.
Classical probability space representations for simple quantum mechanical experiments
thus have a measurable set corresponding to each possible measurement outcome, with the
measure of the former equal to the probability value of the latter. If two possible measure-
ments are compatible, (i.e., if they commute,) then the probability value of a “yes” outcome
on their joint measurement—i.e., a “yes” outcome on both measurements—is the measure
assigned to the intersection of their corresponding measurable sets.
There is a close connection between classical probability space representations and Bell-
type inequalities:
Theorem 1 (Fine 1982b,c; Pitowsky 1989). The statistics for outcomes of a simple quantum
mechanical experiment satisfy all Bell-type inequalities if and only if the experiment has a
classical probability space representation.
It is well known that the statistics for some simple quantum mechanical experiments,
namely the EPR-Bohm setup, violate Bell-type inequalities, so it follows from theorem 1
that those experiments cannot be given a classical probability space representation. Hidden
variable theories, though, tend to have the ambition to provide a coherent and consistent
representation for all quantum mechanical experiments. Thus theorem 1 can be thought of
as a no-go result for the use of classical probability spaces as hidden variable theories. For
ease of comparison with the no-go results that we present later, we will state this first no-go
result explicitly as follows.
Corollary 1. There exist simple quantum mechanical experiments with no classical proba-
bility space representation.
Consider, then, the following much broader type of representation.
Definition 5. A weak (noncontextual) probability space is an ordered triple (X,Σ, µ), where
X is a nonempty set, Σ ⊆ P(X), and µ : Σ→ Y ⊇ [0, 1].
Definition 6. A weak (noncontextual) hidden variable representation for a simple quantum
mechanical experiment (H, ψ,On) is a quadruple (X,Σ, µ, E), consisting of a weak proba-
bility space (X,Σ, µ) and a map E : On → Σ satisfying both of the following conditions:
1. for each Pi ∈ On, µ(E(Pi)) = 〈ψ|Pi|ψ〉, and
2. for each Pi, Pj ∈ On, if Pi ⊥ Pj, then E(Pi) ∩ E(Pj) ∈ Σ and µ(E(Pi) ∩ E(Pj)) =
〈ψ|PiPj|ψ〉 = 0.
3It is “restricted” since one might demand the second condition hold for all collections of compatible
observables, not just pairs. Cf. definitions 5 and 6 of Feintzeig (2015).
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Weak hidden variable representations demand much less than classical probability space
representations. First, weak representations do not require the event space Σ to be an
algebra for X or the function µ to be a probability measure. The event space Σ need
not have any nice algebraic properties at all, and the function µ can be valued in any set
containing the real unit interval, including complex or negative numbers. Second, while
weak representations still require each possible measurement of the experiment to have a
corresponding “measurable” set, instead of requiring all possible joint measurements to
have as corresponding “measurable” sets the intersection of those for their single component
measurements, they only require this for orthogonal observables. (Note that this is a strict
subclass, since orthogonal observables are commuting observables but not vice versa.) The
concept of a weak hidden variable representation is not intended by itself as a model for a
hidden variable theory. Indeed, actual proposed noncontextual hidden variable theories (see
§3) generally add more structure than is demanded by a weak hidden variable representation.
Rather, it is intended as a broad framework that encompasses many actual, more interesting
hidden variable proposals as specializations. Because our theorem concerns weak hidden
variable representations, it bears upon all such specializations, as we discuss in section §3.
The engine behind the central theorem is the Kochen-Specker theorem:
Theorem 2 (Kochen and Specker 1967). For any Hilbert space H with dim(H) ≥ 3, there
is a finite collection of projection operators On = {P1, ..., Pn} on it such that there is no
function f : On → {0, 1} that assigns 1 to exactly one element of every subset of On whose
elements are mutually orthogonal and span H.
In particular, because this theorem can be understood as a proof of existence—that
there exists, in particular, a simple quantum mechanical experiment with such and such
properties—we shall employ the concept of a witness to the theorem:
Definition 7. A KS witness is a simple quantum mechanical experiment (H, ψ,On) such
that dim(H) ≥ 3 and there is no function f : On → {0, 1} that assigns 1 to exactly one
element of every subset of On whose elements are mutually orthogonal and span H.4
We will need only the following two very weak constraints on weak hidden variable
representations (X,Σ, µ, E) of a simple quantum mechanical experiment (H, ψ,On).
Weak Classicality (WC) If Q ⊆ On consists of only mutually orthogonal projection op-
erators spanning H, then (X,ΣQ, µ|ΣQ) is a classical probability space, where ΣQ is the
smallest algebra for X containing {E(Pi) : Pi ∈ Q}.
No Finite Null Cover (¬FNC) There is no finite collection {B1, . . . , Bm} ⊆ Σ such that
µ(Bi) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and
⋃m
i=1Bi = X.
WC demands that the statistics associated with special collections of commuting opera-
tors, namely ones that are often interpreted as being simultaneously measurable, can always
be modeled by a classical probability space. This fits with our ordinary empirical practice
4Notice that if (H, ψ,On) is a KS witness, then so is (H, ψ′,On) for any distinct ψ′ ∈ H because the KS
theorem does not depend on any choice of state vector. We nevertheless include an arbitrary state vector ψ
in all of our results to highlight the structural similarity with Bell-type no-go theorems.
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in which the results for a single setting of an experiment are always indicative of classical
probabilities. ¬FNC, on the other hand, rules out a certain kind of pathology. It requires
that there is never a finite collection of probability zero events that cover the entire space,
or in other words, that there is no finite collection of probability zero events whose disjunc-
tion is guaranteed to occur. Of course, classical probability space representations always
satisfy both of these conditions; weak hidden variable representations need not, which is
why we must include both WC and ¬FNC as explicit additional assumptions. Using these
conditions, we now state our main result.
Theorem 3. No KS witness (H, ψ,On) has a weak hidden variable representation (X,Σ, µ, E)
satisfying both WC and ¬FNC.
The strategy of the proof is to consider the corresponding measurable sets E(Pi) for all
collections of mutually orthogonal projection operators Pi in On that span H. One then
removes points of the sample space X that are either in none of the sets E(Pi), or are in
E(Pi) ∩ E(Pj) for orthogonal Pi and Pj: these are, respectively, hidden states that realize
none of the observables corresponding to the Pi spanning H, and hidden states that realize
incompatible (orthogonal) observables. Hidden states in these two classes allow for the
construction of what would otherwise be a KS-prohibited function f : On → {0, 1} because
they break the correspondence between mutually orthogonal operators spanningH and value
definiteness. ¬FNC guarantees that this procedure does not remove all the points of X, and
from at least one remaining point, one can construct a KS-prohibited function f , leading to
a contradiction.
Proof. For the sake of deriving a contradiction, suppose there is a KS witness (H, ψ,On)
with a weak hidden variable representation (X,Σ, µ, E) satisfying WC and ¬FNC. Let
C1 = {E(Pi) ∩ E(Pj) ∈ Σ : Pi ⊥ Pj}
and let R1 =
⋃
C1. According to this definition, R1 is the collection of all hidden states
in X that would yield “yes” outcomes to some pair of “contradictory” measurements, i.e.,
orthogonal projectors. Further, for any subcollection Q ⊆ On, let TQ =
⋃
Pi∈QE(Pi), and
then define
C2 = {X\TQ : Q ⊆ On contains mutually orthogonal projection operators spanning H}
and R2 =
⋃
C2. According to this definition, R2 is the collection of all hidden states in
X that would yield a “no” outcome for some collection of “exhaustive” measurements, i.e.
orthogonal projectors spanning H. Finally, define the “reduced” space X ′ = X\(R1 ∪ R2)
and subsets A′i = E(Pi) ∩X ′.
We claim that X ′ is non-empty. To see this, note that for any Q ⊆ On whose members
are mutually orthogonal and span H, by WC (X,ΣQ, µ|ΣQ) is a classical probability space
with ΣQ the smallest algebra containing {E(Pi) : Pi ∈ Q}. Since ΣQ is closed under unions,
TQ ∈ ΣQ, hence µ(TQ) = µ
(⋃
Pi∈QE(Pi)
)
=
∑
Pi∈Q µ(E(Pi)) =
∑
Pi∈Q〈ψ|Pi|ψ〉 = 1. Since
ΣQ is closed under complementation, X\TQ ∈ ΣQ, hence µ(X\TQ) + µ(TQ) = µ((X\TQ) ∪
TQ) = µ(X) = 1. It follows that µ(X\TQ) + 1 = 1, so µ(X\TQ) = 0.
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Therefore R2 is a finite union of null sets. By the hypothesis of a weak hidden variable
representation, µ(E(Pi) ∩E(Pj)) = 0 when Pi ⊥ Pj, so R1 is a finite union of null sets, too.
It then follows from ¬FNC that R1 ∪R2 cannot cover X, so X ′ must be non-empty.
Thus we may consider some x ∈ X ′ and define fx : On → {0, 1} as
fx(Pi) =
{
1, if x ∈ A′i,
0, if x /∈ A′i,
which is just χA′i(x), the characteristic function of A
′
i. Now consider any Q ⊆ On whose
members are mutually orthogonal and span H.
First, we claim that x ∈ A′i = E(Pi) ∩X ′ for at least one Pi ∈ Q. For, since X\TQ ⊆ R2
and X ′ ∩R2 = ∅, X ′ ∩ (X\TQ) = ∅. But since X ′ ⊆ X, X ′ ∩ (X\TQ) = X ′\(X ′ ∩TQ), hence
X ′ ∩TQ = X ′. Thus
⋃
Pi∈QA
′
i =
⋃
Pi∈Q(E(Pi)∩X ′) = X ′ ∩
(⋃
Pi∈QE(Pi)
)
= X ′ ∩TQ = X ′.
Hence the A′i cover X
′, so x must be in at least one A′i.
Second, we claim that x ∈ A′i = E(Pi)∩X ′ for at most one Pi ∈ Q. Note that A′i ∩A′j =
(E(Pi)∩X ′)∩(E(Pj)∩X ′) = (E(Pi)∩E(Pj))∩X ′. Since Pi ⊥ Pj if i 6= j, E(Pi)∩E(Pj) ⊆ R1.
Furthermore, R1 ∩X ′ = ∅, so (E(Pi) ∩ E(Pj)) ∩X ′ = ∅. Hence A′i ∩ A′j = ∅, which shows
that x cannot belong to both A′i and A
′
j for any two distinct Pi, Pj ∈ Q.
Thus, x ∈ A′i for exactly one i, from which it follows that f(Pi) = 1 for exactly one
Pi ∈ Q. Furthermore, this holds for any Q ⊆ On whose members are mutually orthogonal
and span H. But by theorem 2, this function f cannot exist, which yields our desired
contradiction.
This shows that under very weak constraints, one arrives at a no-go result for weak hidden
variable representations quite similar in form to the no-go result for classical probability
space representations. It is worth making explicit how the logical structure of this result
replicates that of the Bell-type theorems presented above; since the KS theorem guarantees
the existence of KS witnesses, we can state the result as follows.
Corollary 2. There exist simple quantum mechanical experiments with no weak hidden
variable representation satisfying both WC and ¬FNC.
If one wants to use some kind of weak hidden variable representation to recover the
predictions of quantum mechanics, then one must reject one of the assumptions, WC or
¬FNC. Either of these options comes with a high price, as we will discuss in §4. Before
doing so, we show that theorem 3 applies to many kinds of hidden variable theories and
alternative probability theories that have been explicitly proposed for quantum mechanics.
3 Applications
In this section we apply theorem 3 to a variety of alternative noncontextual probability the-
ories that have been proposed for quantum mechanics. Each of these probability theories
weakens the assumptions of classical probability spaces in some particular way. The gener-
alized probability spaces considered in §3.1 relax the requirement that the events form an
algebra. The extended probability spaces considered in §3.2 relax the requirement that the
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range of the measure is contained in the real unit interval. Lastly, both the upper (lower)
probability spaces in §3.3 and the quantum measure spaces of §3.4 relax the second Kol-
mogorov axiom (additivity), although in slightly different ways. We will save discussion of
the interpretation of finite null covers for §4.
3.1 Generalized Probability Spaces
Arthur Fine (1982b; 1982c) has argued that the real lesson we learn from Bell’s theorem
is that one cannot assign joint probabilities to incompatible observables. One way to un-
derstand this is as a proposal to use so-called generalized probability spaces, as suggested
by Suppes (1965, 1966); Krantz et al. (1971); and Gudder (1988).5 The complaint against
classical probability space representations is that, even though they make no requirements
on the actual probability values assigned to conjunctions of incompatible observables, these
representations do require that we assign some probability or other to such conjunctions.
This is because if Σ is an algebra, then whenever A,B ∈ Σ, it follows that A∩B ∈ Σ. Gen-
eralized probability spaces relax the requirement that the event space Σ forms an algebra,
allowing us to assign probabilities to the individual events corresponding to the outcomes of
incompatible observables without assigning any probability at all to their conjunction.
Definition 8. An additive class for a nonempty set X is a nonempty subset of the power
set P(X) such that
1. for all A ∈ Σ, X\A ∈ Σ, and
2. for all disjoint A,B ∈ Σ, A ∪B ∈ Σ.
Notice that the only way that the definition of an additive class differs from that of an
algebra is the restriction to disjoint sets in clause 2.
Definition 9. A generalized probability space is a triple (X,Σ, µ), where Σ is an additive
class for the nonempty set X and µ : Σ→ [0, 1] is such that
1. µ(X) = 1, and
2. for all disjoint A,B ∈ Σ, µ(A ∪B) = µ(A) + µ(B).
Even though the Kolmogorov axioms 1 and 2 carry over exactly intact, generalized prob-
ability spaces are different from classical probability spaces in that the measure µ need not
assign any probability at all to the union or intersection of events in Σ that are not disjoint.
Malament (2012) has found a generalized probability hidden variable representation for the
Bell-EPR setup (Clauser et al., 1969). So it may seem as if generalized probability spaces
escape the purview of Bell’s theorem. Nevertheless, theorem 3 shows generalized probability
spaces do not escape the KS theorem.
Proposition 1. Every generalized probability space is a weak probability space.
5Note that this is not the solution Fine favors; rather, he suggests the use of what he calls prism models
(Fine, 1982a), which we will not analyze in this paper.
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Corollary 3. There exist simple quantum mechanical experiments with no weak hidden
variable representation on a generalized probability space satisfying both WC and ¬FNC.6
3.2 Extended Probability Spaces
Many authors have proposed extending the range of values that a probability measure can
take in order to accommodate the predictions of quantum mechanics, especially those impli-
cated in testing Bell-type inequalities. There are two obvious ways to do so: first, one can
allow the probability measure to take on negative values, extending its range from [0, 1] to
R.
Definition 10. A negative probability space is a triple (X,Σ, µ), where Σ is an algebra for
the nonempty set X and µ : Σ→ R is such that
1. µ(X) = 1, and
2. for all disjoint A,B ∈ Σ, µ(A ∪B) = µ(A) + µ(B).
While the Kolmogorov axioms 1 and 2 carry over intact as before, negative probability
spaces differ from classical probability spaces only in the range of the measure. This idea
has a distinguished pedigree in quantum physics, going back at least to Dirac (1942) but
also Feynman (1948, 1987), especially in the context of the latter’s path integral formulation
of quantum mechanics. In these approaches, negative probabilities are taken as convenient
intermediates in calculations, hence are not clearly intended to have any interpretive sig-
nificance in a hidden variable theory. But other authors have explicitly developed negative
probability hidden variable models for a variety of systems, often to escape the usual con-
clusions of the EPR (1935) and Bell (1964, 1971) results.7,8 (See Mu¨ckenheim (1986) and
Home and Selleri (1991, §3.5) for reviews of some of these approaches.)
A variation on this idea is to use p-adic probability distribution for the hidden variable
theory (Khrennikov, 1995a,b, 2009). Given any rational number x, one can represent x =
par/s, where p is prime and r, s are integers not divisible by p. Then the p-adic norm of x
is |x|p = p−a, which intuitively measures “how divisible” x is by p. The p-adic numbers are
the Cauchy completion of the rational numbers with the p-adic norm instead of the usual
Euclidean norm. It turns out that negative rational numbers can respresent limiting relative
frequencies on this theory, which in turn generate a p-adic probability measure, so that some
probabilities can indeed be represented as negative in this sense (Khrennikov, 1995a,b, 2009).
Finally, in work with both practical and foundational ambitions, Hartle (2004, 2008)
and Gell-Mann and Hartle (2012) argue for the inclusion of negative probabilities in a for-
6See Feintzeig (2015) for an extensive discussion of generalized probability spaces and a slight variation
on the main theorem applied to them.
7See, for example, Mu¨ckenheim (1982, 1986); Polubarinov (1988); Wo´dkiewicz (1988); Home et al. (1991);
Agarwal et al. (1992); Sudarshan and Rothman (1993); Rothman and Sudarshan (2001); Scully et al. (1994);
Han et al. (1996); and Kronz (2005, 2007, 2008, 2009).
8 Kronz (2005, 2007, 2008, 2009) requires that the range of µ is contained in [−1,∞), calling the resulting
spaces non-monotonic probability spaces. This restriction makes no difference for our remarks.
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mulation of the decoherent histories approach to quantum mechanics.9 They address the
problem of interpreting negative probability values as follows: first, they point out that
the probabilities dictated by a physical theory instruct (rational) agents on how to bet on
outcomes of phenomena under that theory’s purview. Standard arguments from subjective
Bayesian probability theory, the so-called Dutch book arguments, seem to demand that the
Kolmogorovian axioms for classical probability theory must hold for the degrees of belief of
any rational agent, which determine which bets the agent regards as fair. However, they
point out that these arguments only apply to bets which are settleable, that is, bets about
events, knowledge of which the agent in question will certainly know at some point. They
then argue that only bets on sufficiently coarse-grained alternative histories will be settleable,
where this coarse-graining guarantees that the alternatives’ probabilities will lie in the unit
interval. However, because Hartle (2008) and Gell-Mann and Hartle (2012) demand in their
decoherent histories framework a single real fine-grained history over a set of preferred vari-
ables, it can be reformulated as a noncontextual hidden variable theory to which theorem 3
applies. We discuss this application at the end of this subsection.
In the second approach to extending the range of the probability measure, one goes
even further, allowing it to take on complex values, as proposed by Ivanovic´ (1978); Youssef
(1991, 1994, 1995, 1996); Miller (1996); Srinivasan and Sudarshan (1994); and Srinivasan
(1995, 1998, 2006).10
Definition 11. A complex probability space is a triple (X,Σ, µ), where Σ is an algebra for
the nonempty set X and µ : Σ→ C is such that
1. µ(X) = 1, and
2. for all disjoint A,B ∈ Σ, µ(A ∪B) = µ(A) + µ(B).
Just as with negative probability spaces, complex probability spaces differ from classical
probability spaces only in the range of the measure. Youssef shows that complex probability
spaces arise from a generalization of the Cox (1946) axioms for probability that, among other
virtues, explicitly allow one to avoid the standard conclusions of Bell’s theorem against local,
realistic theories (Youssef, 1994, 1995). Miller also arrives at complex probability spaces
through a consideration foundational issues, in particular of time-symmetric formulations of
quantum mechanics involving weak measurement. Srinivasan, meanwhile, is motivated by
giving a measure-theoretic treatment to the complex values taken on by path integrals.
But application of theorem 3 shows that, despite their attractive features, the pathological
features of negative and complex probability spaces will be quite a bit stronger.
Proposition 2. Every negative and complex probability space is a weak probability space.
Corollary 4. There exist simple quantum mechanical experiments with no weak hidden
variable representation on a negative or complex probability space satisfying both WC and
¬FNC.
9 In this context especially, Halliwell and Yearsley (2013) suggest restricting attention to negative prob-
ability spaces, which they call quasiprobability distributions, whose marginal distributions match those of
some Kolmogorovian probability space. This restriction makes no difference for our remarks.
10Srinivasan (2006) also considers quaternionic probability spaces, which he sometimes calls extended
measure spaces. The same results below apply to these spaces as well.
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As mentioned above, this corollary implicates versions of the decoherent histories for-
malism that demand a unique fine-grained history (Hartle, 2008; Gell-Mann and Hartle,
2012) on a preferred set of values, like field configurations or particle positions. Briefly, this
framework postulates a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive maximally fine-grained his-
tories of these preferred values. This set becomes the sample space for a negative probability
distribution.11 In particular, at each time there is a negative probability distribution for
the preferred variables. Because this distribution typically is intended to reproduce all the
predictions that standard quantum mechanics would make, including the predictions for KS
witnesses, the corollary applies.
Previously, Bassi and Ghirardi (1999, 2000) had argued that the decoherent histories
framework in general would run afoul of the KS theorem if it was committed to its as-
signments of properties in histories (or probabilities thereof) being “objective” elements of
reality, i.e., to them being independent of the choice of set of mutually exclusive and exhaus-
tive properties. As Griffiths (2000a,b) pointed out, however, most versions of the decoherent
(or consistent) histories approach make these value assignments only relative to such a choice
of set; different value assignments using different sets cannot be combined. This is called the
single framework (or family) rule. In the version of decoherent histories proposed by Hartle
(2008) and Gell-Mann and Hartle (2012), the arguments of Bassi and Ghirardi (1999, 2000)
do not strictly apply, for one set of variables determining mutually exclusive and exhaustive
properties is privileged. However, our results show that the KS theorem still has a bearing
on this version. We will discuss these implications for the decoherent histories approach
further in §4.
3.3 Upper (Lower) Probability Spaces
Suppes and collaborators (Suppes and Zanotti, 1991; de Barros and Suppes, 2000, 2010;
Hartmann and Suppes, 2010) have suggested that a slightly different type of hidden variable
theory, using so-called upper probability spaces, does not run afoul of Bell-type theorems
and thus may be a viable approach to the completion of quantum theory. This possibility
seems to arise from the relaxation of one property of a classical probability measure: instead
of being additive on disjoint measurable sets, an upper probability is only subadditive.
Definition 12. An upper (lower) probability space is a triple (X,Σ, µ), where Σ is an algebra
for the nonempty set X and µ : Σ→ [0, 1] is such that
1. µ(X) = 1, and
2. for all disjoint A,B ∈ Σ, µ(A ∪B) ≤ (≥) µ(A) + µ(B).
The only way that upper and lower probability spaces differ from classical probability
spaces is in clause 2, requiring only subadditivity or superadditivity. An additional condition
that upper probability measures are often demanded to satisfy is monotonicity : for any
A,B ∈ Σ, if A ⊆ B then µ(A) ≤ µ(B). When an upper probability measure satisfies this
11 Hartle (2004) calls probability assignment lying outside the unit interval virtual probabilities, and Hartle
(2008) and Gell-Mann and Hartle (2012) call them extended probabilities, but the formal definition is the
same.
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condition then it generates a lower probability measure in a canonical way (Suppes and
Zanotti, 1991). The upper and lower probabilities assigned to events together constitute
an interval-valued probability assignment. Such spaces have been used in other contexts in
psychology and behavioral science for modeling agents with imprecise beliefs (Bradley, 2015).
Suppes and Zanotti (1991) have suggested that they may also be useful for modeling quantum
systems, but only if monotonicity is dropped. In particular, Suppes and collaborators have
constructed concrete upper probability hidden variable theory for both the EPR (Hartmann
and Suppes, 2010) and GHZ (de Barros and Suppes, 2000, 2010) experiments. This seems to
suggest that hidden variable theories modeled on upper probability spaces avoid Bell-type
no-go results. But, again, it is easy to see that theorem 3 implies that upper probability
spaces cannot avoid the KS theorem.
Proposition 3. Every upper (lower) probability space is a weak probability space.
Corollary 5. There exist simple quantum mechanical experiments with no weak hidden
variable representation on an upper (lower) probability space satisfying both WC and ¬FNC.
This shows that any upper probability hidden variable theory for quantum mechanics
must violate either WC or ¬FNC when it represents a KS witness. Although the examples
considered by Suppes and collaborators for the EPR (Hartmann and Suppes, 2010) and GHZ
(de Barros and Suppes, 2000, 2010) experiments themselves do not contain enough possible
measurements to be KS witnesses, the measurements they do concern are subsets of KS
witnesses. Thus, since these examples satisfy WC, one can avoid contradiction with the KS
theorem by finding a finite null cover for the space. To do this, in appendix A we explicitly
construct a finite null cover consistent with each of their examples. One might accept that
upper and lower probability spaces will lead to certain kinds of pathologies because, as Suppes
and Zanotti (1991) already appear to accept, these models must be nonmonotonic. But our
result implies that to use upper and lower probability spaces for quantum mechanics, one
must additionally accept the pathology of a finite null cover, which may be less palatable.
3.4 Quantum Measure Theory
Sorkin (1994, 1997) proposes an alternative probability theory for use in quantum gravity and
quantum cosmology. He claims that quantum mechanics is a special case of an alternative
probability theory in which the additivity requirement is weakened to allow for pairwise,
but no higher-order, interference. These he calls quantum measure spaces. (See Gudder
(2010a,b) for a mathematical treatment, which we follow.)
Definition 13. A quantum measure space12 is a triple (X,Σ, µ), where Σ is an algebra for
the nonempty set X and µ : Σ→ [0, 1] is such that
1. µ(X) = 1, and
2. for all pairwise disjoint A,B,C ∈ Σ,
µ(A ∪B ∪ C) = µ(A ∪B) + µ(B ∪ C) + µ(A ∪ C)− µ(A)− µ(B)− µ(C).
12Gudder (2010b) also includes an extra condition called regularity. For our purposes it suffices to consider
the simpler and more general spaces defined here, of which Gudder’s are a special case.
12
The only way that quantum measure spaces differ from classical probability spaces is in
clause 2. While not requiring the usual additivity axiom, quantum measure spaces instead
require a weaker condition amounting to additivity on triples of events.13 The failure of
additivity on pairs of events allows for the possibility of pairwise interference. So, Sorkin
claims, one can accurately represent quantum experiments like the triple slit setup, where
quantum mechanics predicts pairwise interference but strict additivity on triples.
Since Sorkin’s suggestion, there has been quite a bit of work on quantum measure the-
ory, including using it as a model for a noncontextual hidden variable theory. For example,
Craig et al. (2007, p. 519) explicitly suggest that “it is possible to attribute the correlations
in the EPRB setup to non-contextual hidden variables, so long as they are quantal hidden
variables,” that is, hidden variables described using quantum measure theory rather than
classical probability theory. Moreover, previous work on the KS theorem in the context
of quantum measure theory revealed specific cases where a finite null cover arose for cer-
tain quantum measures designed to recover the empirical predictions of quantum mechanics
(Dowker and Ghazi-Tabatabai, 2008; Surya and Wallden, 2010). But theorem 3 allows us to
conclude something quite a bit stronger—that finite null covers are in a certain sense generic
in quantum measure theories, in that they must appear in any quantum measure theoretic
representation of a KS witness. First, we state our result with the same logical structure as
the previous propositions.
Proposition 4. Every quantum measure space is a weak probability space.
Corollary 6. There exist simple quantum mechanical experiments with no weak hidden
variable representation on a quantum measure space satisfying both WC and ¬FNC.
Surya and Wallden (2010) investigated a related question, whether an event A ∈ Σ of a
quantum measure space admits of a (nontrivial) quantum cover. A quantum cover for A ∈ Σ
is a collection {Ai} ⊆ Σ such that A ⊆
⋃
iAi and for any quantum measure µ, µ(Ai) = 0 for
all i implies µ(A) = 0. They were able to show that every non-atomic event of the algebra
Σ, in particular the whole space X, possesses a quantum cover if X is finite in cardinality.
Our results, by contrast, can be restated as follows:
Proposition 5. If a KS witness has a weak hidden variable representation on a quantum
measure space (X,Σ, µ), then for each A ∈ Σ not all covers of A can be quantum covers. In
particular, not all covers of X can be quantum covers.
Thus, even if X has some quantum cover, our result shows that X must also have some
cover that fails to be a quantum cover. Dowker and Ghazi-Tabatabai (2008) and Surya and
Wallden (2010) have advocated for an interpretation of quantal measure-zero events as being
“precluded” from occurring and argued that the problem with classical probability models
of noncontextual hidden variable theories is that they allow for events covering the sample
space to be precluded in KS witnesses. However, the above proposition shows that moving
to quantum measure spaces is no help: they too must have a set of precluded events that
cover the sample space.
13 One can also generalize to even weaker additivity constraints, to which our results apply equally.
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4 Against Finite Null Covers
We believe that the condition WC is unobjectionable, for the use of classical probability
theory in experiments without noncommuting observables is an anodyne feature of scientific
practice. To save the possibility of noncontextual hidden variable theories, one might there-
fore be tempted to reject ¬FNC. However, it is not obvious what a physical interpretation
of a finite null cover could be. We now show a further feature of finite null covers that make
such a rejection at the very least unattractive. Specifically, we show that a finite null cover
involves a kind of pathology or irrationality for those who use it to set their degrees of belief.
A physical theory involving probabilities usually aspires to instruct its users on how to
set their expectations to outcomes of experiments within the theory’s purview, if the theory
is to be regarded as correct. If such a theory dictates that the probability of a certain event
is p, a bet that pays out s (in dollars, say,) would have a fair price of ps: taking such a bet
would on average not yield any net gain or loss if the agent’s degrees of belief are a classical
probability measure. Thus, one way to describe betting irrationalities in probability theories
is through the concept of a Dutch book, a finite sequence of bets that the agent regards as
fair but which is guaranteed to yield a loss for the agent.
For our purposes, a Dutch book in a weak probability space (X,Σ, µ) is a collection of
events B1, ..., Bm ∈ Σ along with numbers s1, ..., sm ∈ R such that for any x ∈ X,
m∑
i=1
si(χBi(x)− µ(Bi)) < 0,
where χBi(x) is the characteristic function of Bi, i.e.,
χBi(x) =
{
1, if x ∈ Bi,
0, if x /∈ Bi.
The events Bi are those on which an agent is betting, with the numbers si representing the
payout for a winning bet on Bi (and siµ(Bi) representing the bet’s fair buy-in). If a weak
probability space contains a Dutch book, then an agent who sets their beliefs according to
that probability space will accept as fair a series of bets on which she is guaranteed to lose
money. Hence, a Dutch book illustrates a kind of irrationality or pathology in the probability
space in question.
Proposition 6. If a weak probability space (X,Σ, µ) violates ¬FNC, then it contains a Dutch
book.14
Proof. Let B1, ..., Bm be a finite null cover for X. Let si < 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Then
for any x ∈ X, we know that x ∈ Bi for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} so
m∑
i=1
si(χBi(x)− µ(Bi)) =
m∑
i=1
siχBi(x) < 0.
14See also Feintzeig (2015) for a discussion of Dutch Books in the context of generalized probability spaces.
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This shows that whenever a weak probability space violates ¬FNC, anyone who sets their
beliefs according to that probability space will be irrational in the sense that she will accept
as fair a series of bets on which she is guaranteed to lose money.
Is there any way around this deficiency? In the context of negative probability spaces,
Hartle (2004) and Gell-Mann and Hartle (2012) consider the problem of whether a Dutch
book can be made against an agent who assigns negative probabilities to some histories.
They point out that certain events will not be settleable by an agent, i.e., their outcome will
not be recorded in any records in the agent’s history. Under the appropriate decoherence
conditions, negative probability events will not be settleable. Although the events in a finite
null cover are not assigned negative probability, one might question whether they are all
settleable; if they are not, then an agent setting her degrees of belief according to them
would not be susceptible to a Dutch book. However, each individual event does seem to be
setttleable: an examination of the proof of theorem 3 shows that the events in question can
be constructed by finitely many logical operations from the measurements determined by
compatible projection operators in a simple quantum mechanical experiment. That is, for
any individual probability zero event in a finite null cover, one could do an experiment to
check whether this event occurs.
It might be protested that despite this, several of the events together are not settleable
since the projection used to generate one probability zero event in the finite null cover may
fail to commute with the projection used to generate another probability zero event in the
finite null cover. Thus, one might object that one cannot always jointly settle some pairs of
events in a finite null cover. However, the union of the entire collection of probability zero
events in the finite null cover must be settleable, for settling this event—namely, checking
whether any of the individual probability zero events occurs—is equivalent to settling the
question of whether anything happens. A persistent objector must then demand that a
highly nonclassical logic of betting: that placing a finite sequence of bets does not commit
one to a bet on their disjunction. This is impossible with a classical disjunction, which is
true just in case on of its disjuncts is true.
So we have not yet found satisfactory physical interpretation of finite null covers, and we
conclude that a finite null cover appears to represent a kind of irrationality in a nonclassical
probability theory. We stress that the problem with finite null covers does not only arise in a
subjective belief interpretation of probability theory—similar considerations weigh against,
for example, relative frequency interpretations of finite null covers as well because one would
have to make sense of a finite number of relative frequency zero events who collectively have
relative frequency one. Thus, we conclude that a finite null cover indicates a pathology in any
probability theory, regardless of the interpretation of probability we choose. Noncontextual,
non-Kolmogorovian hidden variable theories therefore do not clearly offer any advantages
over contextual theories.
5 Conclusion and Future Directions
We have considered a variety of generalizations of probability theory that researchers have
proposed in order to construct hidden variable models for quantum mechanics. These alter-
native probability theories—including generalized probability spaces, extended probability
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spaces, upper/lower probability spaces, and quantum measure spaces—all have the advantage
of avoiding Bell’s theorem. We showed that even though these generalizations of probabil-
ity theory avoid Bell’s theorem, they nevertheless fall prey to another no-go theorem due to
Kochen and Specker. The KS theorem implies that if we apply any of these alternative prob-
ability theories in quantum mechanics, then it must violate one of two weak constraints—it
must either fail to be weakly classical, or else contain a finite null cover. We submit that
the constraint of weak classicality is an unobjectionable precondition to making sense of
any probabilistic experiment in quantum physics, and weak classicality has been implicitly
accepted by all the authors considered. On the other hand, a finite null cover is a kind of
pathology in any alternative probability theory. So the result of this paper can be under-
stood as a no-go theorem for the use of these alternative probability theories for quantum
mechanics.
There is still further research to be done in this area. First, there are other alternative
probability theories that have been proposed for quantum mechanics that are not yet known
to fall under the purview of our results—for example, the prism models of Fine (1982a), the
deterministic nonmeasurable models of Pitowsky (1983), the generic models of Van Wesep
(2006a,b), and perhaps others. Further work is required to see whether the results of this
paper can someone be extended to rule out even more alternative probability theories that
have been proposed for quantum mechanics. Second, the results of this paper show a logical
relation between the KS theorem and Bell’s theorem: the KS theorem is, in a certain sense,
stronger than Bell’s theorem, for the former rules out hidden variable models that the latter
does not, but not vice versa. However, one finds a plethora of other no-go theorems in the
literature, including the recent PBR theorem (Pusey et al., 2012). It would be interesting to
investigate the logical relations between the KS theorem, Bell’s theorem, and other existing
no-go results. Is there one no-go theorem whose witnesses encompass all the others’?
A Null Covers for Some Upper Probability Space Hid-
den Variable Models
A.1 EPR Setup
In the Bell-EPR setup (Clauser et al., 1969), Alice and Bob have two possible “yes/no”
measurements they can make on the Bell state. Let A,A′ and B,B′, respectively, denote the
events that these measurements return the value “yes”. The projection operators correspond-
ing with each element of {A,A′} commutes with that of each element of {B,B′}, but that of
A (B) does not commute with that of A′ (B′). Despite this non-commutativity, Hartmann
and Suppes (2010) propose to assign an upper probability to the algebra of events generated
from these four that also reproduces the predictions of quantum mechanics. That is, they
consider an upper probability space (X,Σ, µ) and assign the following upper probabilities
µ(C) to the atomic events C of X, where for any S ∈ Σ, Sc = X\S:
16
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They also assign the following (partial) joint probabilities:
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In addition, they set
µ(A) = µ(Ac) = µ(B) = µ(Bc) = µ(A′) = µ(A′c) = µ(B′) = µ(B′c) = 1/2.
They verify that these assignments are consistent and reproduce the predictions of quantum
mechanics for a certain Bell-EPR experiment, even though they do not uniquely specify an
upper probability space, which requires 216− 2 = 65, 534 assignments to make. Note as well
that the symmetry of the EPR state requires that these assignments are invariant under the
atomic complementation map.
Theorem 3 implies that the upper probability space hidden variable theory described
above must contain a finite null cover if it is not inconsistent, since it satisfies WC. The
following additional assignments witness that possibility:15
µ(Ac ∩ ((A′c ∩B) ∪ (A′ ∩Bc ∩B′))) = µ(A ∩ ((A′ ∩Bc) ∪ (A′c ∩B ∩B′c))) = 0,
µ(Ac ∩ ((A′ ∩Bc) ∪ (A′c ∩B ∩B′c))) = µ(A ∩ ((A′c ∩B) ∪ (A′ ∩Bc ∩B′))) = 0.
Note that these assignments are also preserved under the atomic complementation map. To
show this assignment is consistent with the previous assignments, we must check that µ is
still subadditive on disjoint sets. This is automatic for the decomposition of these newly
assigned null sets. The only superset of any of these null sets that is assigned a measure so
far is the whole space. So, for example:
1 = µ(X)
≤ µ(Ac ∩ ((A′c ∩B) ∪ (A′ ∩Bc ∩B′))) + µ((Ac ∩ ((A′c ∩B) ∪ (A′ ∩Bc ∩B′)))c)
= µ((Ac ∩ ((A′c ∩B) ∪ (A′ ∩Bc ∩B′)))c)
≤
∑
atomic C∈X
µ(C)
− µ(Ac ∩ A′c ∩B ∩B′)− µ(Ac ∩ A′c ∩B ∩B′c)− µ(Ac ∩ A′ ∩Bc ∩B′)
= 1 +
3
8
−
(
1
8
+
√
3
8
)
− 1
8
−
(
1
8
−
√
3
8
)
= 1,
15Such an additional assignment to realize a finite null cover does not appear to be unique in general,
although it may be so in specific cases.
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where in the last line we have used the calculation at the bottom of p. 97 of Hartmann and
Suppes (2010). The remaining verifications are similar. Since subadditivity holds for this
decomposition into atoms, it holds for decomposition into larger subsets as well.
A.2 GHZ Setup
For the GHZ setup (Greenberger et al., 1989, 1990; Mermin, 1990), there are three “yes/no”
observables, none of which pairwise commute. Let A,B,C denote the events that these ob-
servables return the value “yes.” In order to reproduce the predictions of quantum mechanics,
de Barros and Suppes (2010) make the following assignments to the atoms of an upper prob-
ability space hidden variable model (X,Σ, µ) for this setup, where again Sc = X\S for any
S ∈ Σ:
µ(A ∩B ∩ C) = µ(Ac ∩Bc ∩ Cc) = 1,
µ(Ac ∩B ∩ C) = µ(A ∩Bc ∩ C) = µ(A ∩B ∩ Cc) = 0,
µ(A ∩Bc ∩ Cc) = µ(Ac ∩B ∩ Cc) = µ(Ac ∩Bc ∩ C) = 0.
They also make the following (partial) joint assignments:
µ(A) = µ(B) = µ(C) = 1,
µ(Ac) = µ(Bc) = µ(Cc) = 0.
Since their assignments are designed to satisfy WC and reproduce the quantum mechanical
expectations, on pain of contradiction they must be compatible with the existence of a finite
null cover by theorem 3. Their assignments do not completely determine the values the
upper probability measure takes on all 28−2 = 254 nontrivial measurable sets, but by fixing
the following assignment the finite null cover is achieved:
µ((A ∩B ∩ C) ∪ (Ac ∩Bc ∩ C) ∪ (A ∩Bc ∩ Cc) ∪ (Ac ∩B ∩ Cc)) = 0.
To show this assignment is consistent with the previous assignments, we must check that
the measure is still subadditive on disjoint sets. This is automatic for its decomposition into
disjoint sets because it is null. The only superset of this null set assigned a measure so far
is the whole space:
1 = µ(X)
≤ µ((A ∩B ∩ C) ∪ (Ac ∩Bc ∩ C) ∪ (A ∩Bc ∩ Cc) ∪ (Ac ∩B ∩ Cc))
+ µ(((A ∩B ∩ C) ∪ (Ac ∩Bc ∩ C) ∪ (A ∩Bc ∩ Cc) ∪ (Ac ∩B ∩ Cc))c)
= µ(((A ∩B ∩ C) ∪ (Ac ∩Bc ∩ C) ∪ (A ∩Bc ∩ Cc) ∪ (Ac ∩B ∩ Cc))c).
Hence
1 = µ(((A ∩B ∩ C) ∪ (Ac ∩Bc ∩ C) ∪ (A ∩Bc ∩ Cc) ∪ (Ac ∩B ∩ Cc))c)
= µ((Ac ∩Bc ∩ Cc) ∪ (A ∩B ∩ Cc) ∪ (Ac ∩B ∩ C) ∪ (A ∩Bc ∩ C))
≤ µ(Ac ∩Bc ∩ Cc) + µ(A ∩B ∩ Cc) + µ(Ac ∩B ∩ C) + µ(A ∩Bc ∩ C)
= 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 = 1.
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